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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

28 March 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-64 (Part I): SOVIET BLOC
CAPABILITIES, THROUGH MID-1953 (Draft for Con-
sideration by Board)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet Bloc political warfare capabilities and
military capabilities, through mid-1953.

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

1. Two of the most basic questions involved in this estimate derive from its title. Most studies of this type are labelled "Soviet Capabilities" or "Soviet War Potential" and deal only with the USSR and only with the military capabilities of the USSR. That seems an unreal approach. The terms of reference for this estimate were drawn up on the assumption that the study cannot be limited to the USSR and must include the entire Bloc. Moreover, they were prepared on the assumption also that the political warfare capabilities as well as the military capabilities must be examined.

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2. Throughout these terms of reference, I therefore assume that the Kremlin has complete control of the European Satellites and that the strength and weaknesses of the Satellites must be included with those of the USSR, although the problem of integration and utilization must be studied. NIE-33, Soviet Control of the European Satellites and their Economic and Military Contributions to Soviet Power, through Mid-1953 (7 November 1951) is apparently still solid and reliable so far as Soviet control is concerned. However, the conclusions with regard to the Satellite contributions to Soviet Bloc political, economic, scientific, and military strength will have to be re-examined, since that paper was the first attempt to study that problem and since new data have been collected since that estimate was published.

3. I assume also, in these terms of reference, that the Kremlin has at least an alliance with Communist China, based on common interests and a common ideology. NIE-58, Sino-Soviet Relations, now in draft, should determine what the current and probable future relationships between the USSR and Communist China are, and will be, so far as can now be decided on the evidence available. However, the issue of Communist China's contribution to the Soviet Bloc's capabilities has not yet been faced squarely and must somehow be met in this estimate.

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4. The section on military capabilities suffers heavily from the definition of "capabilities" which is imposed on us. It is in many ways senseless to analyze the Bloc's military strength in a paper on the Bloc's political and military capabilities without being able at the same time to estimate the effectiveness of the military forces when opposed. "There can be no such thing as a calculable national potential -- potential for the achievement of goals by peaceful or warlike means -- so long as the calculation proceeds in a vacuum."^{1/}

I. SOVIET BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES

Soviet Bloc political warfare techniques include political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities, the actions of Communist Parties and Communist Party-controlled trade unions outside the Bloc, support of various kinds of revolutionary movements, and psychological warfare.

A. Current Soviet Bloc Political Warfare Capabilities

This section can probably be completed most effectively by an analysis of Bloc capabilities area by area: Western Europe, the Middle East, etc. At the same time, the fact that

^{1/} Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, 1951), 45.

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the international Communist movement is centrally controlled from Moscow and that it possesses a doctrine which apparently provides the answers for all problems should always be kept in mind.

1. What are the Communist capabilities in this area?
 - (a) What is the political strength, stability, and organization of the principal governments in the area?
 - (b) What are the political orientations of the principal non-Communist opposition groups?
 - (c) What is the strength and influence of each of the Communist Parties?
 - (d) Does the economic situation offer opportunities for political warfare?
 - (e) What is the susceptibility of the people of each important country to Communist propaganda, and to economic and military pressure?
 - (f) What is the attitude of the people toward rearmament, toward the East-West struggle?
2. To what degree has Soviet Bloc success in political warfare been due to the Bloc's military power, pressure, and prestige?
3. What has been the impact of the expansion of Soviet power since World War II upon the international Communist movement?

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4. How has the effectiveness of Bloc political warfare been affected by the emergence of Communist China?

B. Probable Soviet Bloc Political Warfare Capabilities, through Mid-1953

This can probably be done most easily by the area approach, with the questions of Section A extended to cover the period of the estimate. One should assume here a continuation of the cold war and of the present policies of each of the major powers. However, any developments which could seriously affect these capabilities should be considered seriously, e. g., the withdrawal of the French from Indo-China or the conclusion of a truce with the Viet Minh, which would in effect mean French withdrawal.

1. What will be the effect upon Soviet political warfare capabilities of growing Western unity and strength? Of Western division and weakness?
2. What is the over-all outlook for Bloc political warfare capabilities during the period of this estimate?
3. What will be the probable effect of Bloc political warfare efforts upon the strength and determination of the West and upon Bloc military strength?

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II. POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES

This section seeks to determine the current stability of the Soviet regime in the USSR, the extent and strength of Soviet control over the European Satellites, the current relationship between the USSR and Communist China (NIE-58 should resolve this), the stability of the Chinese Communist regime, the factors which might produce change in any of these situations, the probable development of morale throughout the Bloc, and, above all, the effect which the political factors may have upon Bloc military capabilities.

A. Current Political Situation

1. What is the relationship now existing ~~to~~ the USSR between the Communist Party, the Secret Police, and the military forces? Are there any strains within any of these groups or between the groups?
2. What is the present degree of control exercised within the USSR and how is it exercised? How effective has the regime been in winning active support for its domestic and foreign policies?
3. What effect upon Soviet Bloc military capabilities is produced by factors such as the growing gap between the Communist Party leaders and the rank and file of the nation, by the rise in living standards, by the rearmament effort, by the campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" in the Ukraine?

4. What is the character and extent of the Kremlin's control over the European Satellites? To what extent does Soviet control depend upon Soviet police and military force, upon Satellite police and military force? How successful has the Kremlin been in winning active support in the Satellites for its policies?
5. What is the character and extent of Kremlin influence or control over Communist China?
6. What has been the impact of the expansion of Soviet power since World War II upon the international Communist movement? How has this, in turn, affected Soviet Bloc military capabilities?
7. What is the estimated effect of current political developments within the Bloc upon Bloc military capabilities?

B. Probable Political Developments

1. Is there any evidence or likelihood that the ability of the Soviet regime to maintain control within the USSR will be shaken or threatened? What effect would be produced by a decision such as that to reactivate the agrogorod scheme? What would be the effect of a new decline of the living standards? What other anticipated or probable domestic developments might affect the maintenance of control?

2. Is there any evidence or likelihood that the Kremlin's ability to control the European Satellites will be shaken? Which domestic or international issues are likely to threaten Soviet control? Would the Kremlin be able to maintain control, use the Satellite territories as military bases, and use Satellite forces during general war?
3. What will be the probable character and extent of Kremlin influence and control over Communist China?
4. What are the probable effects upon political developments within the Bloc of the continuation of the cold war and of the present conflicts in Korea and Indo-China, of extension of the war in the Far East (Burma, e. g.), of limited attacks in the Middle East, of general war without the use of mass destruction weapons, of general war with the use of mass destruction weapons?
5. In each of these instances, what will be the probable effect of political developments within the Bloc and within the international Communist movement upon Bloc military capabilities?

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III. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET BLOC
MILITARY CAPABILITIES

This section should estimate the current capability and probable developments of Soviet Bloc science and the effect Bloc science may have upon Bloc military capabilities. It should provide an over-all view of the more complex Bloc technical weapons and systems, of the status of research and development in the most important fields, and of the application of Bloc science and technology to combat capabilities.

A. This section is designed to provide a general assessment of Soviet Bloc basic scientific and technical capabilities, the trends of Soviet Bloc scientific and technical developments, and the effects of Bloc science and technology upon Soviet Bloc strategy, tactics, and capabilities.

1. Priority assigned to Soviet Bloc basic science and research and development.
2. Quality and quantity of scientists and of engineering groups.
3. Training and educational institutions.
4. Effect of ideology.
5. Significance of information acquired abroad.
6. Satellite and Chinese Communist contributions.

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7. Limitations upon progress.
 8. Vulnerability of research and development facilities to attack.
 9. Trends.
 10. Over-all effects upon strategy, tactics, and military capabilities.
- B. This section is designed to provide an analysis of Bloc science capabilities in the most important fields, of the weapons and weapons systems which will probably be developed and produced, and of the resultant effect on Soviet Bloc military capabilities.
1. Atomic weapons
 - (a) Fissionable
 - (b) Thermonuclear
 2. Radiological weapons
 3. Biological weapons
 4. Chemical weapons
 5. Electronics equipment (Communications, Radar and Fire Control, Radio Navigation, Infra-Red, ECM, Influence Fuzes)
 6. Guided Missiles (SAM, ASM, SSM, AAM)
 7. Aerial Weapons (Bomber, Fighter, Attack, and Other Special Purpose Craft; Engines, Armament, Equipment)
 8. Land Combat Weapons (Tanks, Artillery, Anti-tank, Mines, Bridging, Small Arms)

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9. Antiaircraft Artillery (Artillery, Rockets)
10. Special Arctic Equipment
11. Naval Weapons (Surface, Submarine, Coastal)
12. New Weapons Systems likely to appear not falling
into one of the above.

IV. ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The EIC study of Soviet economic capabilities should resolve most of the issues important here, and our task may be limited largely to checking data and ascertaining what the impact of the economic capabilities is and will be upon military capabilities. Our principal interests here are in the following:

1. Current production of the key materials, products and weapons.
2. Current resource allocation of national income.
3. Bloc ability to increase production of military items.
4. Bloc ability to expand industrial and agricultural production.
5. Operational stocks and stockpiles of critical materials, equipment, and weapons.
6. Pattern of trade as it affects the Bloc economy and military potential.

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7. Contribution to Bloc strength made by economies of the Satellites and of Communist China. Ability of Bloc to integrate its economies.
8. Status and probable effect of Soviet dispersal of industry program.
9. Significance of foreign capital equipment, technical knowledge, and materials for maintaining and developing the current Bloc program.
10. Ability of the Bloc economy to produce new weapons developed by Bloc scientists, while at same time performing other critical functions.
11. Indications that the long-term investment programs designed to increase the productive capacity of the USSR, the Satellites, and Communist China has been, or will be, seriously altered to achieve greater immediate war-readiness.
12. In the various kinds of war listed earlier, what will be the ability of the Bloc economy to maintain and increase military production, and what will be the probable effect of Bloc economic capabilities upon Bloc military capabilities?

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V. SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES

A. Current Military Strength

1. Present strength -- size, composition, equipment, mobility, training, morale, combat efficiency, disposition, and coordination -- of the Soviet, Satellite, and Chinese Communist military forces and of those forces coordinated.
2. Size and quality of present holdings of military equipment by Soviet Bloc military forces, estimated size and quality of military stockpiles, military consumption rates of Soviet forces under cold and hot war conditions.
3. Control, direction, and integration of the forces of the Bloc -- ground forces, airborne forces, navy and merchant fleets, and air forces (tactical, long range, air defense, naval, airborne, and civil).
4. Bloc strategic and tactical doctrine.

B. Current Bloc Capabilities

1. Capacity of Bloc forces to initiate and maintain various kinds of military campaigns: present conflicts in Korea and Indo-China, extension of war

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by proxy in Far East, limited attacks in Middle East, general war without use of mass destruction weapons, general war with use of mass destruction weapons.

2. Capacity of Bloc to defend itself against air attack, including atomic attack, and to carry attack to UK and US. (Bloc atomic inventory, number and range of Bloc aircraft capable of delivering atomic bombs, probable Bloc target priorities, operational readiness of Bloc long-range aircraft.)
 3. Capacity of Bloc to maintain campaigns while economy and supply lines under attack.
 4. Capacity of Bloc forces to hold and utilize territories added to Bloc or overrun by Bloc forces in early stages of any war.
- C. Probable Bloc Military Strength
- D. Probable Bloc Military Capabilities

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